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Abstract
Executive Stock Options (ESOs) are modiﬁed American options that cannot be valued
using standard methods. With a few exceptions, the literature has discussed the ESO fair
value by assuming unpredictable stock returns which are not supported by the available
empirical evidence. In this paper we obtain the fair value of American ESOs when
stock returns are predictable and, speciﬁcally, driven by the trending Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
process of Lo and Wang (1995). We solve the executive’s portfolio allocation problem for
a simple buy-and-hold strategy when his wealth can be distributed between a risk-free
asset and a market portfolio. This problem is jointly solved with the executive’s optimal
exercise policy. We ﬁnd that executives tend to wait longer the higher the predictability,
independently of the composition of executive’s asset menu. We have also analyzed the
implications under the FAS123R proposals for the ESO fair value and found that, even
for low autocorrelations, there is a meaningful mispricing when unpredictable returns are
erroneously assumed.
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11 Introduction
Executive Stock Options (ESOs hereafter) are typically an important part of executive com-
pensation packages. Hall and Murphy (2002) report that in 1999, 94% of S&P 500 companies
granted ESOs to their top executives, and these grants accounted for 47% of total pay of S&P
500 CEOs. ESOs are American-style stock options modiﬁed for incentive reasons. Thus,
ESOs cannot be sold or transferred, although partial hedge is possible by trading correlated
assets. In addition, they can only be exercised after ending the vesting period. Consequently,
standard methods for valuing American options are not directly applicable and a growing
literature has been searching for a solution to the issue of ESO valuation.
A common assumption in this literature is that the stochastic process driving the dynamics
of the underlying stock price can be represented as a geometric Brownian motion (GBM)
process. Under this assumption, the stock returns turn out to be independent and identically
distributed normal variates. However, there is by now a wide agreement in recognizing that
this assumption does not ﬁt well the empirical evidence concerning time series returns. As
summarized, for instance, in Taylor (2005), there are three stylized facts characterizing the
returns distribution at daily frequencies. First, the distribution of returns is not normal,
it has typically fat tails with a high peak (leptokurtosis). Second, the autocorrelation of
daily returns (predictability) is extremely low but statistically meaningful and third, there
is positive dependence between squared returns. The impact on the ESO valuation of the
last issue has been analyzed, among others, in Brown and Szimayer (2008), Le´ on and Vaello-
Sebasti` a (2009) and Yiang and Tian (2010). Nonetheless, to the best of our knowledge,
modeling return autocorrelation in the stock price dynamics equation has been neglected in
the literature of ESO valuation. There are two reasons for that. First, the constant drift
term plays no role in the Black-Scholes (BS) formula according to the early result by Grundy
(1991),1 who states that the BS formula still holds even though the underlying asset returns
follow an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) process. Second, although the predictability of stock
returns is now widely accepted by ﬁnancial economists, there has been a long tradition in
favor of the ”random walk” model for stock prices. Nonetheless, as we will show later, very
low levels of autocorrelation generate signiﬁcant biases in pricing ESOs.
1See page 1049.
2Chapter 2 of Campbell et al. (1997) report autocorrelations for CRSP stock returns
for both equally-weighted and value-weighted indexes. They ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant
positive serial correlation at the ﬁrst lag, which is robust across subsamples. The weekly and
monthly return autocorrelations also exhibit a positive and statistically signiﬁcant value at
ﬁrst lag over the entire sample and for all subsamples. Poterba and Summers (1988) also
ﬁnd negative autocorrelations for monthly CRSP data. Taylor (2005) surveys the evidence
of predictability for several return series such as indexes, equities, futures and currencies for
diﬀerent time horizons and ﬁnds that these autocorrelations are very small but signiﬁcant.2
For instance, more than 90% of the 600 autocorrelation estimates are between -0.05 and
0.05. These low but statistically signiﬁcant autocorrelations imply that stock returns are
predictable. Campbell and Yogo (2006) show more evidence of a predictable component in
stock returns by building an eﬃcient predictability test leading to valid inference regardless
of the empirical evidence of high degree of persistence of the predictor variables (such as the
dividend-price ratio, earnings-price ratio or measures of the interest rate).
This paper aims to analyze the eﬀects of predictability in a restricted sense, namely, when
return predictability comes only from their time series statistical properties. Therefore, we
shall focus on univariate processes by following the same line of research as Lo and Wang
(1995). They discuss the eﬀect of predictability on the market value of European options
by modeling initially a univariate trending Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (TOU) process, which is a
continuous time AR(1) process. Under this setting, one can only model negative autocor-
relations of returns. To model positive autocorrelations, one has to resort to multivariate
TOU processes already introduced by Lo and Wang (1995). Along these lines, in a constant
volatility framework, they show that the autoregressive parameter has opposite eﬀects on
option prices, with negative (positive) autocorrelations increasing (decreasing) prices. This
result is a peculiarity of the TOU process and does not hold in general.3
In any case, what Lo and Wang (1995) deﬁnitely show is that predictability of stock
returns aﬀects the prices of options written on those stocks. This is remarkable because in
their set-up predictability is induced by the drift, which does not enter into the option pricing
2More empirical references about the autocorrelation of returns can be seen in Taylor (2005).
3For instance, Hafner and Herwartz (2001) show that there is no such asymmetry in discrete-time when
the data generating probability measure follows an AR(1)-TGARCH(1,1) structure. Thus, the sign of the
autoregressive parameter is irrelevant, all that matters is its size.
3formula. The rationale is that, unlike the GBM process with a constant drift underlying the
BS formula, the sample variance of discretely-sampled returns is not an appropriate estimator
of the instantaneous variance when returns are predictable. Now, the estimation for the
instantaneous variance is obtained as the sample variance adjusted by a factor that captures
predictability depending on the ﬁrst-order correlation coeﬃcient of a discrete AR(1) process,4
which is the exact solution to the TOU process. Finally, observe that the closed-form option
valuation they obtain corresponds, in our setting, to the ﬁrm’s cost of an European ESO for
a risk-neutral executive.
Recent examples that can be found in the literature about the impact of stock returns
predictability on the valuation of options are, among others, Liao and Chen (2006), Huang
et al. (2009) and Paschke and Prokopczusk (2010). In the ﬁrst paper, the stock return is
modeled as a continuous-time MA(1)-type process. They show that the impact of autocor-
related returns on European option prices is signiﬁcant even when the MA(1) parameter is
small. Contrary to the TOU process, the autocorrelated behavior of returns comes from the
diﬀusion term. In the second paper, the authors propose an ARMA process for the stock
return and model American options by using the local risk-neutralization principle of Duan
(1995) and the Least squares Monte Carlo (LSM) approach by Longstaﬀ and Schwartz (2001).
They show that the AR eﬀect is more signiﬁcant than the MA eﬀect in option pricing. Both
papers refer to an earlier paper by Jokivuolle (1998), who values European options on au-
tocorrelated indexes under a discrete-time framework. Finally, the third paper develops a
continuous time factor model of commodity prices that allows for higher-order autoregressive
and moving average components. In this set-up, they obtain closed-form pricing formulas
for futures and options when the price dynamics are driven by a continuous autoregressive
moving average (CARMA) process.5
Here, we are interested in the behavior of long-term American ESOs under predictability
for returns driven by the TOU process and using the algorithm of Le´ on and Vaello-Sebasti` a
(2010), which is based on the LSM method, for the ESO valuation. As it is well known, we
can distinguish among three possible ESO valuations depending on the restrictions faced by
4See equations (11) and (12) below.
5See Brockwell (2001) for a description of CARMA(p,q) models. Notice that the TOU process is, in fact,
a CARMA(1,0) process.
4the holder. The subjective value for the restricted executive, the objective value (the ﬁrm’s
ESO cost) for the issuing ﬁrm, which is unrestricted but obliged to follow the executive’s
exercise policy, and the market (risk-neutral) value for an unrestricted holder. This value is
just the ESO objective value for a risk-neutral executive. Although we are only interested
on the implications of predictability in stocks returns for the objective valuation of ESOs,
we will also analyze the subjective valuation since this will allow us to infer the executive’s
exercise policy required to obtain the objective value.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the setting for ESO
valuation. We distinguish between the case in which the ESO cost is driven by only the stock
price, or the one state-variable (S1) model, which corresponds to the framework put forward
initially by Hall and Murphy (2002), and the case in which the ESO cost is also aﬀected
by the availability of a market portfolio, or the two state-variable (S2) model, introduced
by Cai and Vijh (2005). Section 3 presents our results concerning the S1 model. In this
section we perform an extensive sensitivity analysis examining the size and sign of the bias
that is incurred when the objective ESO value is obtained by assuming a GBM process for
the stock price. In Section 4, we include a market portfolio as an additional investment for
the executive’s wealth and show the diﬀerences in the results because of its introduction. In
Section 5, we apply our framework to evaluate the bias induced by the computation of the
ﬁrm’s ESO cost using the FAS123R method. Section 6 concludes. We have also included
three appendices corresponding to Section 2. In Appendix A, we show the exact solution
of the TOU process and its properties. Appendix B, we provide a detailed description of
the algorithm mentioned above for valuing both, objective and subjective ESOs. Finally,
Appendix C summarizes the optimization and numerical details to obtain the ESO subjective
valuation.
2 Model description
To analyze how predictability aﬀects the ﬁrm’s ESO cost, we need to obtain previously the
executive’s exercise policy. This exercise policy is characterized, as usual, by a threshold price
and it comes from solving the ESO subjective valuation problem. Then, by using the risk-
neutral measure and the threshold price, the ESO objective value follows. See, for instance,
5Kulatilaka and Marcus (1994), Hall and Murphy (2002) or Ingersoll (2006).
2.1 The set-up
We assume an environment in which the executive has an initial wealth,  0, of which a
proportion   is held in restricted stocks of the company that cannot be sold until the ESO
maturity. The larger  , the more related is the executive’s wealth to the ﬁrm’s market value
and so, the higher the idiosyncratic risk supported. The remainder of the initial wealth,
(1− ) 0, is distributed between the market portfolio and the risk-free asset in proportions
  and 1 −   respectively. This composition is decided at time 0, the grant date, and held
unchanged until the end of the planning period, given by the ESO maturity, at time  .
In other words, we assume the executive follows a buy-and-hold strategy for both market
asset and risk-free holdings. This is in line with Barberis (2000), who also incorporates the
eﬀects of predictability. Of course, a more realistic situation would allow   to vary across the
investment horizon period. But, since we also need to ﬁnd at the same time the executive’s
exercise policy, such a strategy becomes hard to compute and the implementation of both
situations are beyond the scope of our study.
Next, the executive is granted with an amount of   at-the-money ESOs with an exercise
price of  . Thus, the executive wealth at maturity is conditioned on the ESO exercise date.
Let us denote by   ∣  the executive’s wealth at maturity conditional on the ESO exercise
at time   ≤  . Then, if the ESOs are not exercised until maturity, the executive’s terminal
wealth is
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where    and    denote the ﬁrm’s stock and market portfolio prices at date  . The yearly
stock dividend yield, denoted as ¯  , is assumed to be reinvested in restricted stocks.6 The
main point here is that the executive does not receive any payment from restricted stocks
until  . Finally,    denotes the yearly risk-free rate.
Given our assumed buy-and-hold strategy for the executive’s portfolio, if the ESOs are
6For simplicity, this model assumes that the investment in the market portfolio is done through an index
fund, which does not pay dividends since it reinvests all dividend proceeds.
6exercised at time   <  , he will invest the ESO proceeds according to the same initial
combination of market portfolio and risk-free asset. Thus,
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Notice that, despite the ESO exercise, the executive must maintain his restricted stocks until
 . We shall assume that    follows a GBM process driven by
    =        +        ,  , (3)
while    ≡ ln   follows a trending Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (TOU) process:
    =
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   +     ,  , (4)
where   ≥ 0 and    ,    ,  =    . Notice that the TOU process includes the GBM process
as a particular case when   = 0. We can rewrite equation (4) as
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Note that, when    deviates from its trend   , it is pulled back at a rate  , the speed of mean
reversion, proportional to its deviation.7













1 −  





if   = 1,
(6)
where   > 0 is the coeﬃcient of relative risk-aversion.
The executive maximizes the expected utility of his terminal wealth allocating his outside
wealth between the market portfolio and the risk-free asset to their optimal sizes, denoted as
 ∗ and 1 −  ∗ respectively, and selecting his optimal ESO exercise date,  ∗. Therefore, the
7The exact discrete-time solution for equation (5) and its properties are described in Appendix A.
7executive’s maximum expected utility is given by
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. (7)
In short, we assume an asset allocation framework for a buy-and-hold investor (the executive)
regarding both risk-free and market asset holdings.
2.2 Model implementation
The methodology used to solve the program described by equation (7) is a modiﬁed version of
the LSM algorithm of Longstaﬀ and Schwartz (2001) for pricing path dependent derivatives.
It consists on two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, equation (7) is solved for a grid of values of  .
This yields the executive’s exercise policy, deﬁned by a unique threshold price, for each   in
the grid. Observe that we also obtain the corresponding expected exercise date,  , for each
  in the grid. Appendix B provides a detailed description of how these values are obtained.
Then, in a second stage, we select the corresponding values for both the market portfolio
share and the threshold price denoted, respectively, as  ∗ and  ∗, yielding the maximum
executive’s expected utility. Finally, after ﬁnding  ∗, we can solve for the ESO objective
value,      , using the risk-neutral measure.
We next obtain the executive’s subjective valuation using the certainty-equivalence prin-
ciple already introduced by Lambert et al. (1991). It identiﬁes the subjective ESO value with
the amount of cash that, delivered at the grant date and invested until ESO maturity, reports
the same expected utility to the executive than holding the ESO. This is obtained as follows.
Suppose that, at the grant date, a non-restricted amount of cash CE is delivered in place of
each ESO. Then, the total executive’s wealth at maturity is
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Thus, to calculate the subjective value we only need to ﬁnd the amount CE that provides
the same expected utility than holding an amount   of ESOs. Therefore, as in Tian (2004)






   
 
  
=  ∗. (9)
where  ∗ is given in equation (7). Notice that, for this maximization program, the optimal
market portfolio share in executive’s wealth will be, in general, diﬀerent from that obtained
when the executives chooses optimally the ESOs exercise date ( ∗) and the proportion of
unrestricted wealth to be allocated into the market portfolio ( ∗). 8
Although the paper is not concerned with the properties of the executive’s subjective
valuation under predictability of stock returns, we can illustrate some of them with the help of
Figure 1. In this ﬁgure we have plotted the ratio of the executive’s subjective valuation when
returns are predictable, CE   , with respect to the case of no predictability driven by a GBM
process, CE   . In both cases, the executive’s unrestricted wealth can be allocated only in
the risk-free asset. Clearly, as one should expect, this ratio increases with the predictability of
returns. Furthermore, the ratio is higher the higher the degree of risk-aversion or the higher
the weight of restricted stocks on executive’s wealth.
2.3 Discrete-time return for the TOU process
To implement our model we use the exact discrete-time solution of equation (5). The discrete-
time return at time   for a time period of length ℎ is deﬁned as









Then, the mean of   ,ℎ equals  ℎ. When ℎ is measured as a fraction of a year,   measures the
annual mean of log-return. Similarly, the variance,  2
 , and the autocorrelation at lag one,
  (1), of the discrete-time returns are related to the speed of mean reversion according to the
following expressions:
8We are indebted to an anonymous referee for pointing this to us. Further details about the optimization
are explained in Appendix C.
9Figure 1: Behavior of the subjective ESO value as a function of predictability,  .






































Vesting = 3 years
γ = 2, α = 1/2 γ = 2; α = 2/3 γ = 4; α = 1/2 γ = 4; α = 2/3
This ﬁgure plots the ratio between the subjective value when the stock price is driven by a TOU process,
CETOU, and the corresponding one when the stock price is driven by a GBM process, CETOU, as a function
of the speed of adjustment parameter,  . Other parameters used for the TOU process are   = 0.10 and
  = 0.30. The remaining parameters describing the executive environment are those detailed at the
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where to simplify notation, the dependence of the former deﬁnitions on ℎ has been omitted.
Now, as equations (11) and (12) make clear, when   increases,  2
  decreases but   (1) increases
in absolute value. Finally, observe that the value   = 0 nests the case of a GBM process for
the stock price, for which autocorrelations of log-returns are zero at all lags.
3 The one state-variable framework
In this section we focus on      , that is obtained by using the risk-neutral measure to value
an American call option for which the threshold price is deﬁned by the executive’s exercise
policy. We proceed in two stages. At ﬁrst, we assume executives will have no availability to
a market portfolio to allocate their unrestricted wealth, so that, the parameter   is restricted
10to be equal to zero. We have denoted this framework as the  1 model, since the stock price
is the only state-variable to obtain      . We consider this simpliﬁed version of the model
because the computational cost is much lower (we do not have to ﬁnd  ∗) and the main results
are also valid in the more general case. Nonetheless, in Section 4 we extend our framework
to include the availability of the market portfolio, in addition to the risk-free asset and the
ﬁrm’s stock, giving place to the S2 model to get      .
Following the benchmark case by Hall and Murphy (2002), we consider a representative
executive that owns ﬁve million dollars in initial wealth and is granted with 150,000 stock
options issued at-the-money with   = $1. We maintain as the true data generating process
(DGP) for the stock price the TOU process, as described in equation (5). We explore how
      changes as a result of changes in each of the three parameters characterizing the above
process. Our benchmark (yearly) values for these parameters are:   = 0.50 for the speed
of adjustment,   = 0.10 for the long-run drift coeﬃcient, and   = 0.30 for the diﬀusion
coeﬃcient. Other parameter values are    = 0.06 and ¯   = 0.
According to equation (12) and for our benchmark value of   = 0.50,   (1) is equal to
−0.020 in monthly terms (ℎ = 1/12), −0.005 in weekly terms (ℎ = 1/52) and −0.001 in daily
terms (ℎ = 1/360). This low value of   (1) can be found in the empirical evidence, see Table
4.8 in Taylor (2005). Although it may seem low, it will help us to highlight, in a later section,
the mispricing that can be incurred in the computation of       if a standard GBM process,
that exhibits independent returns, is postulated erroneously as the true DGP for the stock
price.
Now, we are mainly concerned with the consequences of the evidence of stock return
predictability on      . A greater predictability is, in the present setting, a higher size of
  (1). Since the autocorrelations for stock returns found in empirical studies are generally so
low, the GBM process might be a good approximation for the DGP of stock prices. However,
under the true DGP these small autocorrelations come from a mean reversion process such
as the TOU process in equation (5).
All this suggests that we are interested in analyzing how changes in   (1), and hence
changes in  , aﬀect      . Therefore, to control for the change in the volatility of the
discrete-time returns,   , resulting from a change in  , we have also adjusted the diﬀusion
11coeﬃcient,  , in order to keep    unchanged. To be sure that nothing is lost by imposing
this restriction, we have also examined the case in which   is not adjusted, so that changes
in   also modify   . It has turned out that the diﬀerences between both cases, in terms
of objective valuation, average exercise dates and other features of interest, have not been
signiﬁcant. Thus, we focus on the case in which   is adjusted so as to keep    constant.
Considering the above adjustment, a higher   implies only an increase in the size of   (1).
The range of values for  , between 0 and 1, implies a range of ﬁrst-order autocorrelations
between 0 and 0.04 in monthly terms, which are representative of the values found in the
empirical literature cited previously. For the diﬀusion coeﬃcient,  , the values range from
  = 0.25 to   = 0.45, and for the long-run drift coeﬃcient,  , the values range from   = 0.065
to   = 0.15.
3.1 Discussion of results
We study now the impact of changes in  ,   and   in the ESO valuation. Figure 2 summarizes
our main ﬁndings concerning the behavior of       as a function of these parameters. In all
simulations we have considered the case of a 10-year ESO with a vesting period of 3 years,
which is common in both practice and literature. The no vesting case is qualitatively similar
and it is omitted to save space.
Several features can be observed in this ﬁgure. First, as   increases, which means a
higher predictability,       seems to converge independently of the size for   and   (panel
A). Second, an increase in either   (panel B) or   (panel C) supposes a higher value of      .
Thus, as one would expect, the objective valuation increases with the diﬀusion coeﬃcient,  ,
and this is independent of the values considered for   and  . Clearly, a higher   implies a
higher   , which leads to higher stock prices in relatively shorter periods of time.
However, the positive relationship between   and       may be somewhat surprising.
According to the Black-Scholes model, the expected returns are irrelevant for option pricing.
Nonetheless, in the present framework   aﬀects the executive’s exercise behavior, and hence
the ESO objective valuation. With greater expected returns, a higher  , it will be more
proﬁtable for the executive to hold the ESOs for a longer period. Then, higher expected
returns could mitigate the executive’s suboptimal early exercise.
12Figure 2: Behavior of the objective ESO value in the S1 framework.















































γ = 2; α = 1/2 γ = 2; α = 2/3 γ = 4; α = 1/2 γ = 4; α = 2/3
We show the behavior of the objective ESO’s value for a 10-year ESO with a vesting period of 3 years,
 
OBJ, is represented as a function of the speed of adjustment,  , in panel A; the diﬀusion coeﬃcient,  , in
panel B and the long-run drift,  , in panel C. In each panel we have considered two values for the degree of
relative risk-aversion,   = {2,4}, and for the degree of undiversiﬁcation,   = {1/2,2/3}. The other values
for the parameters of the TOU process in equation (5) are:   = 0.10 and   = 0.30 for panel A;   = 0.50
and   = 0.10 for panel B, and   = 0.50 and   = 0.30 for panel C. In all cases, we have set  f = 0.06 and
¯   = 0.
13Table 1: Average exercise dates (in years) and predictability.
 
    0.0 0.05 0.10 0.25 0.50 1.00
2 1/2 7.41 7.42 7.78 8.14 8.31 8.50
2/3 6.33 6.79 7.27 7.80 8.18 8.43
4 1/2 5.01 5.71 6.30 7.19 7.75 8.23
2/3 4.58 5.22 5.73 6.94 7.58 8.13
This table collects the results concerning how the average exercise dates,  
∗, of
our 10-year ESO are aﬀected by diﬀerent values of mean reversion,  , which drives
the autocorrelation of the TOU process in equation (5), respecting diﬀerent levels
of   and  . The column for   = 0 presents the values of  
∗ for the corresponding
equivalent GBM process as described in Appendix A. For all cases, the risk-free
rate, the dividend yield, the ESO maturity and the length of the vesting period
have been set to their benchmark values, namely,  f = 0.06, ¯   = 0,   = 10 and
  = 3.
By deﬁnition,       depends on the executive’s exercise policy. This exercise policy can
be described in terms of either the threshold price,  ∗, or the expected exercise time,  ∗. We
next examine the former results in connection with the obtained values for  ∗. The relevant
results are presented in Tables 1 and 2.
As Table 1 shows, higher values of   imply higher values of  ∗ for all considered com-
binations of   and  . Of course, either a higher   or   makes the executive to exercise
comparatively earlier but, as   increases, these diﬀerences become smaller. Furthermore, the
expected exercise time is comparatively lower for the equivalent GBM process,9 for which
  = 0, in all cases.
To understand the role of predictability in the observed behavior for       and  ∗, we
examine Figure 3 in which we have plotted several simulated paths for the ﬁrm’s stock price
under alternative values of  .10 We have also plotted the long-run trend of the process by a
discontinuous line. As it can be observed, as   increases from 0.05 to 1.00 (i.e.   (1) changes
9This GBM process for stock prices has been constructed in such a way that the mean and variance of the
discrete-time returns are the same than the corresponding ones for the true TOU process. More details are
given in Appendix A.
10To isolate the eﬀects of predictability, the monthly volatility for discrete returns remains constant to
0.0866 in all cases and the four simulated paths in each panel are generated using the same random numbers.
Then, the observed diﬀerences only depend on  . The other relevant parameters have been set to   = 0.10
and   = 0.30 in all simulations.
14from −0.002 to −0.04), the simulated paths tend to revert faster to that long-run trend,
avoiding the paths become very deep in-the-money. Then, as long as the time to maturity
is kept ﬁxed, the average values achieved by the TOU process are comparatively lower the
higher  . Hence, the executive tends to postpone the ESO exercise increasing, accordingly,
the value of  ∗.
Therefore when prices are weakly mean reverting, so that they resemble closely a GBM
process, the executive tends to exercise at relatively high prices. Meanwhile, as the pre-
dictability of the process increases, through a higher  , the executive waits longer on average
(see Table 1) but the average value achieved by the ﬁrm’s stock price turns out to be compar-
atively lower. This has the eﬀect of reducing       for a relatively low risk-averse executive
and increasing       for higher risk-averse executives. Of course, as one would expect, when
  and   are relatively low, the executive tends to wait longer so as to get a higher threshold
price which raises      .
Table 2 exhibits the values of  ∗ for diﬀerent values of   and  . This table also displays
the case in which the stock price is driven by an equivalent GBM process. We can appreciate
that  ∗ decreases regarding   but increases according to  . Once again, the expected exercise
times are comparatively lower for the corresponding equivalent GBM processes. There is
only one exception that takes place for a combination of high values of the drift parameter
(  = 0.15) and low values of both the degree of relative risk-aversion parameter (  = 2) and
the proportion of restricted stocks in executive’s total wealth (  = 1/2). This fact can be
explained as a result of the combination of a high value for the drift and absence of mean
reversion that gives more upside potential and hence, more value to the call option for the
executive. Nevertheless, this exception disappears when the degree of mean reversion is high
enough (  = 1.5).
As Table 2 shows, higher values of   lead to lower values for  ∗, for every value of   and
 . This can be explained along the lines used to understand its positive impact on      .
On the other hand, a higher long-run trend   of stock prices, makes executives to be willing
to wait longer in the expectation of higher threshold prices for their ESOs.
Finally, we have also explored how the former results change with a diﬀerent value for
15Figure 3: Alternative paths for diﬀerent TOU processes.
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This ﬁgure plots alternative paths for the TOU process in equation (5) as a function of the speed of
adjustment parameter,  . The diﬀusion coeﬃcient,  , has been adjusted so as to keep constant the
volatility of the discrete returns,  r, in all cases. The value for this volatility is 0.30 in yearly terms. The
long-run drift is equal to its benchmark value,   = 10%. In the four panels the discontinuous line represents
the long-run trend as given by    +  0 
−￿t. As   increases, the simulated paths tend to revert faster to
this long-run trend, although their volatilities are not altered.
16Table 2: Average exercise dates (in years). The eﬀects of   and  .
Panel A: Diﬀusion coeﬃcient,  
(GBM) (TOU)
    0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45
2 1/2 9.31 7.47 6.67 6.17 5.85 8.63 8.32 8.07 7.87 7.71
2/3 7.72 6.41 5.68 5.34 5.15 8.53 8.20 7.89 7.66 7.50
4 1/2 5.53 5.04 4.80 4.70 4.64 8.20 7.77 7.48 7.26 7.10
2/3 4.87 4.57 4.49 4.42 4.42 8.03 7.60 7.28 7.02 6.82
Panel B: Drift coeﬃcient,  
(GBM) (TOU)
0.065 0.075 0.10 0.125 0.15 0.065 0.075 0.10 0.125 0.15
2 1/2 6.71 6.90 7.63 8.31 9.43 7.69 7.87 8.40 8.70 9.00
2/3 5.77 5.95 6.57 6.94 7.58 7.52 7.72 8.28 8.60 8.91
4 1/2 4.95 4.95 5.07 5.10 5.20 7.24 7.39 7.85 8.16 8.48
2/3 4.58 4.58 4.61 4.76 5.40 7.02 7.18 7.69 8.03 8.39
The right panels collect the results about how the average exercise dates,  
∗, of our 10-year ESO are
aﬀected by the volatility and the mean of returns of the TOU process in equation (5). For comparison
purposes, the left panels present the values of  
∗ for the corresponding equivalent GBM processes as
described in appendix A. For all cases, the risk-free rate, the dividend yield, the time to maturity
of the ESO and the length of the vesting period have been set to their benchmark values, namely,
  = 0.50,  f = 0.06, ¯   = 0,   = 10 and   = 3.
 .11 In particular, a value of   = 0.05 that makes TOU processes to resemble the equivalent
GBM processes, produces more variability in both       and  ∗ as a result of changes in  
and  .
3.2 Cumulative probabilities
We have shown previously that as the predictability of stock returns increases, executives
ﬁnd optimal to wait longer for exercising the ESOs. This relationship has been inferred
from the behavior of the expected exercise time,  ∗. However, this expectation hides some
very interesting pieces of information concerning the probability of the ESO exercise. To
complete our understanding of the executive behavior, we have computed the unconditional
probability that ESOs will be exercised not later than some given date   ≤  . This has been
11The results are available upon request.
17done as follows. In our simulations for the sensitivity analysis, we have considered a monthly
frequency for the ESO exercise dates. This means that, for a 10-year ESO, there is a total of
120 possible exercise dates. Thus, for each of these exercise dates and using a total number
of 200,000 paths (including antithetics), we have computed the ratio
   =
# of paths exercised at time step  
total # of paths
,
which shows the probability the ESO package will be exercised at time  . Notice this is just
a conditional probability because it is conditional on not being exercised earlier than at time
step  . Then, the unconditional probability that ESOs will be exercised exactly at time  ,
denoted as Γ , is
Γ  =   
 −1  
 =1
 
1 −   − 
 
.
Finally, the cumulative probability that the ESO exercise date will be lower than or equal










 =1 Γ . To smooth out the resulting
probability distribution, we have replicated the former procedure a total of 50 times using 50
diﬀerent seeds to generate the random numbers, so that the reported cumulative probabilities
are the average of them.




, have been obtained for each of the re-
levant parameters characterizing the TOU process. Finally, to compare those results with
those obtained under no predictability, we have also computed the cumulative probabilities
of early exercise for each of the corresponding equivalent GBM processes.
Panel A of Figure 4 represents  ( ) as a function of  . Clearly, as   increases, this
probability is lower for any date before the expiration date. Thus, in comparison with the
GBM process, the executive always waits longer for exercising the ESO. Panel B depicts the
case for diﬀerent values of   when the stock price is driven by either a TOU or its equivalent
GBM process. Generally, a higher volatility leads to earlier exercise (lower  ∗) and speciﬁcally
when the level of predictability is low, as in a GBM process. A larger value of   means that
i) the executive’s wealth becomes more volatile due to the ESOs but also because of the
restricted stocks, and ii) the option may be deep in-the-money with a higher probability.
Boths facts suppose an earlier exercise of the ESO, according to panel B ﬁndings. Finally,
18Figure 4: Cumulative probabilities of early exercise.
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for some values of  ,   and  . Panel A shows the curves corresponding to   = 0,   = 0.10,   = 0.50
and   = 1.0. The remaining parameters have been set to   = 0.10 and   = 0.30. In panel B, the curves
represent the cases   = 0.30 and   = 0.40, where the other parameters have been set to   = 0.50 and
  = 0.10. Finally, in panel C the curves represent the cases   = 0.10 and   = 0.15 with the other parameters
set to   = 0.50 and   = 0.30. For comparison purposes, we have also plotted the same probability for the
corresponding equivalent GBM process described in Appendix A. The general ﬁnding is that, executives





￿. In all cases, we have focused on an executive with   = 4 and   = 2/3.
19panel C shows the same situation for several values of   and it does not deserve further
comments.
3.3 The objective bias
In this subsection, we analyze the sign and size of the biases that can occur because of a
misspeciﬁcation of the underlying process for the stock price. As we have mentioned before,
the literature has typically postulated a GBM process for the stock price. This assumption
implies that the discrete-time returns will follow a white noise with drift. But, if the log-price
were to follow a TOU process, as we have assumed in our computations, the discrete-time
returns would follow an ARMA(1,1) process with trend. Thus, the ﬁrm’s cost       would
be biased as a result of an erroneous choice for the stochastic process of the price dynamics.
We designate this bias as12
    1 =
     
  −      
      × 100 , (13)
where      
  denotes the objective value computed under the false hypothesis that prices are
driven by a GBM process. We maintain the notation       to denote the objective value
computed under the true process. We have calculated this bias for diﬀerent values of   and
the results are displayed in panel A of Figure 5. For   = 2, the objective bias is generally
positive and increasing with predictability. Note that the size of the bias is not high in this
case, meanwhile for   = 4 the sign of the bias turns out to be negative and its size becomes
quite substantial even for moderate degrees of undiversiﬁcation.
The results of performing the same analysis but for diﬀerent values of   are depicted in
panel B of Figure 5. We have found the same pattern described before, namely, when the
executive has a low degree of relative risk-aversion and is well diversiﬁed,      
  tends to
overstate the true cost but not much. As the degree of relative risk-aversion increases and
the executive becomes worse diversiﬁed,      
  understates the true cost in such a way that
the size of the bias turns out to be above 10% for most values of  .
We have also computed the objective bias for several alternative values of  . The results
12Notice that the objective value can be computed either using a conventional binomial model or, as we do,
by using the LSM method. We illustrate the size of bias using this latter method, but the results should be
similar with other methods of computing  
OBJ.
20Figure 5: Objective ESO valuation bias under the S1 framework (S1),     1















































γ = 2; α = 1/2 γ = 2; α = 2/3 γ = 4; α = 1/2 γ = 4; α = 2/3
We plot the percentage bias in equation (13), which is incurred when the ﬁrm’s cost of a 10-year ESO with
a vesting period of 3 years is evaluated using a GBM process for the stock price when the true one is a TOU
process. Panels A to C depict this bias as a function of, respectively,  ,   and  , for four combinations of
the relative degree of risk-aversion and the executive’s degree of undiversiﬁcation. In all cases, we have set
 f = 0.06 and ¯   = 0.
21are shown in panel C of Figure 5. Along the lines of the previous results, the sign of the
bias is positive when the degree of risk-aversion is low and the executive is relatively well
diversiﬁed. However, as the degree of risk-aversion increases and the executive becomes less
well diversiﬁed, the sign of the bias becomes negative and its size is also well above 10% for
almost all cases considered.
We can conclude that for high degrees of relative risk-aversion, the objective value assum-
ing a GBM process can understate substantially the true ﬁrm’s ESO cost. Finally, the size of
the bias does not appear to be signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the length of the vesting period and
it has not been reported here.
4 The two state-variable framework
Here we explore how the executive’s exercise policy and hence, the ESO objective value is
modiﬁed by including a market portfolio. This extended set-up is assumed to provide the true
objective value,      . We keep the benchmark values of the previous section for describing
the environment of the representative executive as well as those describing the TOU process.
The parameters characterizing the dynamics of the market portfolio are    = 0.10 and
   = 0.20. The initial value of the market portfolio will be set to one and the correlation
between the innovations in the stock and the market portfolio,  , will be set to 0.50. Basically,
to obtain      
 2 we solve the executive’s problem for a grid of values of   in order to obtain
the value  ∗ which maximizes the executive’s utility.13 This makes  2 model more demanding
in computational terms than the  1 model, which doesn’t need ﬁnding  ∗.
The results are summarized in a ratio that measures the diﬀerence between the objective
value in the one state-variable model,      
 1 , and the objective value in the two state-variable
model,      
 2 , as a percentage of the latter. Hence,
    2 =
     
 1 −      
 2
     
 2
× 100 . (14)
Recall that      
 2 measures the true cost of ESOs for ﬁrms. Cai and Vijh (2005) have shown
that this ratio is positive when the stock price is driven by a GBM process. The reason is that,
13Appendix B provides more details on the numerical algorithm.
22Table 3: Predictability and ESO cost: S1 versus S2 models.
 
    0.05 0.10 0.25 0.50 1.00
0 1/2 13.34 8.16 1.41 -0.24 -0.62
2/3 19.93 13.29 3.11 0.46 -0.34
3 1/2 8.99 6.80 1.01 -0.07 -0.53
2/3 10.02 8.14 2.62 0.44 -0.31
We present here for   = 4 the percentage bias deﬁned in equation (14),
concerning the ﬁrm’s ESO cost when executives have available a market
portfolio to allocate their unrestricted wealth (S2 model) against the case in
which they have not (S1 model). As it is shown, the diﬀerences decrease as
  increases to become negligible for relatively high values of this parameter.
For the rest of the parameters see Table 2 and Section 4.
under model S1, executives can allocate their unrestricted wealth only in the risk-free asset
whereas under model S2, they can also invest in the market portfolio. Since this alternative
becomes more attractive, the average exercise times will be generally lower in the S2 model.
Our results are presented in Table 3. We have restricted our attention on the impact of
changes in predictability, so that we only report the results concerning changes in  . In this
regard, we have maintained our choice of adjusting   such that the volatility of discrete-time
stock returns is not aﬀected.
For the case of   = 4,       increases with   in both S1 and S2 models.14 For   ≥ 0.25,
which implies a ﬁrst order autocorrelation higher than 0.0103 in absolute value, the ﬁrm’s
ESO cost for both models becomes indistinguishable. To get some intuition for this result,
recall that the market portfolio is driven by a GBM process. Then, when executives observe
a higher predictability in the ﬁrm’s stock returns, they do not see any advantage in exercising
earlier to place the proceeds into the market portfolio. As a result, the average exercise time
and the threshold price are essentially the same in both the S1 and the S2 models. This result
becomes quite relevant to the extent that      
 1 can be obtained at a lower computational
costs than      
 2 .
Finally, we have also studied how the share of the market portfolio is aﬀected by changing
14ESO cost for ﬁrms behaves diﬀerently when   = 2. In the S1 model,  
OBJ decreases with  . In the S2
model,  
OBJ increases with  . However the behavior of the percentage bias is completely analogous, namely,
as predictability increases the bias decreases until being negative.
23Table 4: Optimal share of market portfolio ( ∗).
 
    0.05 0.10 0.25 0.50 1.00
0 1/2 0.17 0.18 0.26 0.43 0.55
2/3 0.09 0.08 0.25 0.58 0.76
3 1/2 0.18 0.18 0.26 0.43 0.55
2/3 0.09 0.09 0.26 0.58 0.76
The table displays, for   = 4, how  
∗ is aﬀected by a higher pre-
dictability of the ﬁrm’s stock returns. The volatility of stock returns in
discrete-time is kept constant.
the predictability of the ﬁrm’s stock returns. The results are displayed in Table 4, which
focuses on the impact of diﬀerent values of   and distinguishes between the 3-year vesting
and the no vesting cases. It is shown that a greater predictability leads the executive to put
more wealth in the market portfolio and less into the risk-free asset. In fact, the executive
puts even more weight in the market portfolio for a higher undiversiﬁcation level,  , when
the predictability of the stock returns is above a speciﬁc threshold (see the last two columns
in Table 4). Note that this pattern is independent of the vesting period length.
We have seen that a greater predictability in stock returns leads executives to hold a
higher share of their unrestricted wealth in the market portfolio and also to wait longer for
exercising the ESOs. From an intertemporal point of view, this means that executives are
substituting their holdings of the risk-free asset by ESOs because of their higher expected
return, which is subject to less uncertainty as predictability increases.
5 The FAS 123R bias
As a result of the increasing relevance of ESOs in managers’ compensation packages, the
International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) and the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB) have issued several requirements for a fair valuation of those expenses. Both
standards require to consider the same factors to obtain the fair value: the market price of
the shares, the exercise price of the options, the risk-free interest rate, the expected volatility
of stock prices, the expected dividend on stock and the number of years until options expire.
24However, there are some diﬀerences between both standards. The main accountant dif-
ference concerns the classiﬁcation of the award as a liability or equity. Following FAS 123R,
if there exists a possibility to settle the award in cash, it is always classiﬁed as a liability
award, meanwhile IFRS 2 classiﬁcation is based on the method of expected settlement (cash
or shares), that is, the possibility of cash settlement does not imply a liability award. Other
minor diﬀerences concern the deﬁnition of grant date and the vesting period eﬀects. For
instance, the IFRS 2 establishes the grant date when the agreement is reached, but under the
FAS 123R the grant date is the earlier between the mutual understanding date and the date
when employee begins to provide his services. As regards the vesting period, when account-
ing for ESO plans with graded vesting under the ”European” standard (IFRS 2), we must
treat each tranche as a separate award while under the FAS 123R we can use a straight-line
method for the entire award.
Notice that the above diﬀerences do aﬀect accountant practice but not the concept of fair
value. Thus, the fair value is the same under both standards, independently of which one is
followed to account for the expense. Furthermore, both provide similar recommendations for
computing the fair value and, as a matter of choice, we have selected FASB’s recommendations
to compare our model with these suggestions.
In its Financial Accounting Standard Board (2004) No 123 revised statement (FAS 123R),
the FASB requires ﬁrms to disclose the method used to estimate the grant-date fair value
of their ESO compensation packages. Among the valuation techniques that the FAS 123R
considers acceptable, it appears as candidates both the BS and binomial models. The BS
formula is appealing because of its simplicity. However, there are some features of ESOs that
are not well captured by using this formula. In particular, the BS model assumes European-
style options whereas ESOs are typically American options that executives tend to exercise
before maturity, see Bettis et al. (2005). To consider this fact, the FAS 123R (paragraph
A26) explicitly requires computing this fair value by replacing the ESO expiration date,  ,
with its expected exercise time, or expected life,  ∗. Speciﬁcally, the ESO price should be
calculated as




This procedure leaves ﬁrms with the problem of estimating  ∗. Indeed, we can distinguish
25two possibilities in this regard. First, the ﬁrm can use historical data about the executives’
exercise behavior. Alternatively, the early exercise can be described using some binomial
model that, by capturing the executives’ exercise policy, determines the ESO’s expected life,
the required input in the BS model.
Kulatilaka and Marcus (1994), argue that the FAS123 proposal may yield a biased es-
timation of the ﬁrm’s ESO costs if historical data are used to estimate  ∗, because these
historical data are only one particular realization of stock prices. However, Carpenter (1998)
compares the performance of three alternatives models, an utility-maximizing model, an ex-
tended American option model, in which she introduces an exogenous stopping rate, and
the FAS 123 proposal. She obtains that the three alternatives yield similar values for the
ESO cost when the models are calibrated to yield the same executive’s exercise policy. Am-
mann and Seiz (2004) also compare similar alternative models to compute the ESO fair value.
They clearly show that the expected life of the ESO is the key variable underlying the models,
and that pricing diﬀerences become negligible when the models are calibrated to the same
expected life of the option.
In any case, and independently of the model used to obtain the executive’s exercise policy,
our contention is simply that ﬁrms typically assume that stock prices are driven by a GBM
process. If the true model is a TOU process, the resulting executive’s exercise policy is ﬂawed
and the implied average exercise date would be biased, leading also to a biased fair value.
Therefore, it is interesting to compare the ﬁrm’s ESO cost under the TOU process,      ,
with the BS value obtained under the erroneous DGP that prices are driven by a GBM
process,   ( ∗
 ), where  ∗
  denotes its corresponding expected life. Speciﬁcally, we will
analyze the following percentage bias:
    3 =
  ( ∗
 ) −      
      × 100. (16)
We have focused on the behavior of this bias for diﬀerent values of the parameter  . We
have taken as  ∗
  the value for the case of   = 0, which is the equivalent GBM process for
the stock price. Furthermore, the volatility of the discrete-time returns,   , has been kept
constant by a suitable adjustment of the diﬀusion coeﬃcient,  , as in Section 3. As a result,
the appropriate value of the ﬁrm’s stock return volatility to be plugged into the BS formula
26Figure 6: FAS123 bias. The one state-variable framework.


































γ = 2; α = 1/2 γ = 2; α = 2/3 γ = 4; α = 1/2 γ = 4; α = 2/3
We plot the percentage bias deﬁned in equation (16), which is incurred when the FAS123 procedure is
used and the expected life of the ESO is computed using erroneously the GBM process instead of the TOU
process for stock returns. Both TOU and GBM have been made comparable by equalizing their means
and volatilities. The procedure is described in detail in Section 5. The values of the remaining parameters
are:  f = 0.06, ¯   = 0 and   = 10.
is 30% for all values of  . In our analysis we have assumed a 10-year ESO for the cases of no
vesting and a 3-year vesting period. The results are depicted in Figure 6 for the S1 model.
We can see that the bias is generally negative. Hence, the estimation of the ESO expected
life using a GBM process for the stock price, when TOU is the true process, understates
the true expected cost systematically. This result is related to the behavior of the expected
exercise date already discussed in subsection 3.1. We have shown that executives tend to wait
longer for exercising ESOs when predictability increases, so that the lowest  ∗ is achieved
when   = 0. This, in turn, implies a low BS value for the ESO in comparison with the
ﬁrm’s ESO cost under the TOU process. We show that the size of this bias increases with
the predictability of the process for   = 2, but decreases for   = 4. This is explained by the
diﬀerent behavior of       for each value of the relative risk-aversion parameter.
We end this section by reporting brieﬂy the results for the FAS bias when the S2 model
is considered. By using a similar procedure to that described for the S1 model, we ﬁnd that
the inclusion of a market index only increases the undervaluation incurred when the FAS123
recommendations are used.
276 Conclusions
We have shown that predictability matters for valuing American ESOs from the ﬁrm’s per-
spective. The objective value, or ﬁrm’s ESO cost, is biased if one assumes erroneously that
stock prices are driven by a geometric Brownian motion (GBM) instead of the true process
driven by a trending Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (TOU) process. This bias is signiﬁcant even for rel-
atively low values of the ﬁrst order autocorrelations. The executive performs his ESO exercise
under two alternative asset menu settings. One of them consists only of the risk-free asset
and the other one is extended by including also the market portfolio. When predictability
increases, the pricing diﬀerences between both approaches vanish. Moreover, independently
of the executive’s wealth composition, he waits longer for the ESO exercise the higher the
predictability. Finally, we examine the consequences of predictability for the FAS123 propos-
als. When the erroneous GBM process is used for prices, it generates an undervaluation of
the ﬁrm’s ESO cost, even for moderate low levels of predictability.
Some important extensions for future research are suggested next. First, it would be
interesting to analyze the executive’s asset allocation problem, when there is the possibility
of reallocating the market portfolio along the planning horizon (dynamic allocation) as in
Barberis (2000), jointly with holding American ESOs. The quadratic approximation for the
valuation of ESOs can be a good candidate to make easier its implementation. See, for
instance, Kimura (2010). Finally, it would be also interesting to introduce the executive
forfeiture and the case of perpetual options into our framework. See again Kimura (2010)
and also, Jennergren and N¨ aslund (1996) among others.
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31Appendix A. ARMA representation of exact discretization of TOU process.
We rewrite equation (5) in terms of the detrended process of   :
    = −      +     , ,   > 0
where    ≡    −   and initial condition  0 =  0 = ln 0. The exact solution to this univariate
Ornstein Uhlenbeck (OU) process reverting to an unconditional mean of zero is, according
to Bergstrom (1984), the following discrete-time process:










1 −  −2 ℎ 
. Next, we obtain the equation for Δℎ   ≡
   −   −ℎ and rewrite in terms of the stock return,   ,ℎ, given in equation (10). Then,
  ,ℎ =  ℎ
 
1 −  ℎ
 
+  ℎ  −ℎ,ℎ +   ,    =    −   −ℎ,
where    follows a MA(1) process verifying that
E[  ] = 0 , Var(  ) = 2 2





 ,ℎ if   = 1
0 if   ≥ 2
Hence,   ,ℎ is described by a stationary discrete-time ARMA (1,1) process with an uncon-
ditional mean of  ℎ, an unconditional variance  2
  shown in equation (11) and a negative
ﬁrst-order autocorrelation   (1) exhibited in equation (12). Finally, the returns are nega-
tively correlated at all lags. The higher order autocorrelation coeﬃcients are easily obtained
as   ( ) =  
 −1
ℎ   (1), ∀  ≥ 2.
The following table summarizes the moments of the continuously compounded returns,
deﬁned as in equation (10) under the two alternative processes.
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Mean (¯  )  ℎ
 








1 −  − ℎ 
˜  2ℎ




1 −  − ℎ 
0
˜   and ˜   denote the trend and diﬀusion coeﬃcients of the GBM process.
By matching both unconditional means and variances for the h-period returns under both
processes, we obtain the following constraints in the parameters:
˜   =   +
˜  2
2
, ˜   =  
 
1 −  − ℎ
 ℎ
.
In short, these parameter restrictions lead to a fair comparison across the paper when we aim
to analyze exclusively the eﬀects of predictability on the objective ESO valuation.
Appendix B. Subjective and objective ESO pricing algorithm.
The algorithm used to solve the executive’s problem in equation (7) is based on the
popular LSM algorithm of Longstaﬀ and Schwartz (2001) for valuing American options. The
modiﬁcation to consider a risk-averse option holder was introduced by Le´ on and Vaello-
Sebasti` a (2010). We really adapt this approach, summarized in steps 1 to 6 below, by
changing the dynamics of the stock price process. Given   simulated paths, the algorithm
consists on creating a vector   of length   with the expected utility for each path obtained
from the optimal exercise of the ESOs. For the one state-variable case ( 1) the algorithm
simpliﬁes, since the executive only has to search the optimal exercise time,  ∗ (  = 0). Then,
we ﬁrst explain the algorithm for the  1 model and later, we will extend it for the  2 case.
Step 1: Given   simulated paths of the state-variable (  ), the optimal exercise rule at maturity
( ) is obvious, to exercise all paths in-the-money. Vector    is obtained using equations
(1) and (6) on all paths at  .
Step 2: At   − 1 the executive has to choose between exercising or continuing with the ESOs
for one period. The utility at   in case of exercise at   − 1,  
 
  ∣ −1
 
, is computed
33using equations (2) and (6). Finally, to estimate the expected utility of exercise condi-
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over some basis functions of the state-variable (  −1). The projected val-









Step 3: Compute the expected utility in case of keeping the ESO one period ahead. We only
have to regress the one period ahead utility,   , over basis functions of   −1. Then
ˆ E −1 [  ∣  −1] is the projected value of the previous regression.
Step 4: Compare the expected utility when exercising and holding the ESOs and then, select the








(step 2) with ˆ E −1 [  ∣  −1]








> ˆ E −1 [  ∣  −1] the









Step 5: Repeat steps 2 to 4 up to  0, where  0 can be either the grant date or the ﬁrst time step
after the vesting period, and compute the expected utility as the mean of   .
Step 6: Find the certainty-equivalence using equations (8) and (17).
To compute the expectations at steps 2 and 3 we must select the basis functions. We
have noticed that the algorithm works better when using powers of log(  ) instead of powers
of   , speciﬁcally we use log(  ), [log(  )]
2 and [log(  )]
3. Regarding the number of basis
functions, adding higher order powers yields less stable results because the matrix of basis
functions becomes close to singular. This yields less accurate results when computing the
inverse.15
To obtain the ﬁrm’s ESO cost      , we follow the approach of Hall and Murphy (2002),
which is based on the exercise threshold. This threshold establishes a frontier where the
executive is indiﬀerent between holding or exercising the option. Thus, if the stock price is
above (below) the frontier, the executive will exercise (hold) the ESO.
To compute the exercise threshold, at step 4 in the previous algorithm, we record the
minimum value of    for which the executive decides to exercise the ESO. Once we have ob-
15Moreno and Navas (2003) and Stentoft (2004) provide numerical details about the robustness of the LSM
method. New Monte-Carlo type methods, based on either the Malliavin calculus or the regression based
approaches, to improve the eﬃciency for the pricing of American options can be found in Bouchard and Warin
(2011).
34tained the exercise threshold, we simulate the price dynamics under the risk-neutral measure.
We record the payoﬀs associated to those paths which are exercised at the given threshold.
Then, the payoﬀ is discounted at the risk-free rate.16
The algorithm for the  2 model consists on repeating the previous steps 1 to 6 for a
grid of values of  . Then, we take that value   which maximizes the expected utility,  ∗.
To compute the two expectations into the two state-variable model, we have used up to the
second order powers of log(  ) and log(  ) plus the cross-product, log(  ) × log(  ).17
Appendix C. Optimization and numerical details.
To obtain the subjective ESO valuation, we must ﬁnd the amount CE satisfying equation
(9). It depends upon the model considered. For the  1 model, executives cannot allocate
their unrestricted wealth into a market portfolio. Therefore, for this model we propose the

























  ∣ ∗
  
, can be of order 10−21. Thus, in order to avoid problems in
the numerical optimization we have selected the minimization of a quadratic relative distance
instead of the simple quadratic distance.
Figure 7 shows the shape of the objective function in equation (17) with respect to CE
for diﬀerent degrees of diversiﬁcation  . In this case   = 0.1,   = 4 and the remaining
parameters have been settled to their benchmark values. The left-hand graphic shows the
joint eﬀects of CE and   in the objective function, while the right-hand one displays level
curves. We can appreciate that the objective function is well behaved and exhibits a global
minimum. Accordingly, the minimization in equation (17) converges quickly. This result
holds for a wide range of values for   and  , which are available upon request.
For the  2 model, there is a market portfolio available for allocating the executive’s
unrestricted wealth. Therefore, the previous distance minimization program is no longer
16Remind that  
OBJ is a risk-neutral valuation but considering the executive’s exercise rule.
17Although the inclusion of log( t) × log( t) is recommended by the relevant literature, its contribution
here is small. Further details are available upon request.
35applicable. To solve equation (9), we have implemented a simple iterative procedure in which
CE is also obtained from the minimization of a quadratic relative distance as that described














and the denominator by  ∗, given by equation (7), which is obtained from a a grid-search
procedure as mentioned in the last paragraph of Appendix B. In each step of the iteration a
new value of CE is evaluated until convergence is achieved for some desired level of accuracy.
Further details are available from the authors upon request.
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for a grid of values of   and for diﬀerent levels of   and
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achieves a maximum for some given value of  , denoted as






  ∣ ∗
   
obtained in the former grid-search. Then,  ∗ follows from taking the ﬁrst derivative, namely
 ∗ = − 1/2 2, where    is the  -th order coeﬃcient of the ﬁtted polynomial.











































































α = 0.4 α = 0.5 α = 0.75
The left-hand graphic displays equation (17), the quadratic distance function for model  1, as a function
of CE for diﬀerent degrees of diversiﬁcation  . The right-hand graphic shows three level curves for   =
{0.4, 0.5, 0.75}. The relevant parameters are   = 0.10 and   = 4. The remaining parameters have been
set to the benchmark values enumerated in Section 3.
Figure 8: Expected utility and portfolio choice














































































κ = 0.05 κ = 0.10 κ = 0.15
These graphics display the maximum expected utility, that can be achieved when the executive chooses
the optimal exercise date for the granted ESOs, as a function of the portfolio choice,  . The left-hand
graphic holds a relative risk-aversion coeﬃcient of   = 2 while it becomes   = 4 for the right-hand one.
Each line corresponds to a diﬀerent degree of predictability,  . The rest of parameters has been settled to
the benchmark values enumerated in Section 3.
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